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INTRODUCTION

In December 2007, the American Law Institute ("ALI") approved
the development of a new Restatement, Third, of the U.S. Law of
International Commercial Arbitration (the "Restatement").

On February

23, 2009, the Restaters and authors of this Essay presented a Preliminary
Draft of a chapter of the Restatement (the "Draft") at an invitational
meeting in New York.
The Draft addresses Recognition and
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards. This brief Essay provides some
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of Law. The ideas presented in this Essay are those of the individual Restaters, and are
necessarily very preliminary. They are not intended to forecast or preclude the final
positions that will be taken by the Restatement, which is of course subject to the approval
processes of the American Law Institute.
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reflections of the Reporters from the process of producing and presenting
the Draft.

II. THE NEED FOR AND PURPOSE OF THE RESTATEMENT
The United States occupies a unique place in the modem
international arbitration system and in its historic evolution. On the one
hand, in the early decades of the Republic the United States was one of
the leading proponents of state-to-state arbitration as a means for
resolving international disputes. More recently, American lawyers,
arbitrators and arbitration specialists have been important contributors to
the growth and development of the international commercial arbitration
system, from its very inception and within its most venerable institutions.
Over the years, a number of U.S. judicial decisions have become seminal
reference points for international tribunals, commentators and even
foreign courts in the development of international arbitration precedents. 1
On the other hand, U.S. parties and lawyers have sometimes taken
atypical approaches towards arbitral procedures, particularly when
contrasted to some European counterparts, on matters as diverse as
arbitrator independence, discovery and the role of lawyers. In this latter
respect, some suggest that international arbitration has become
"Americanized," meaning that it has transformed from a flexible and
informal procedural mechanism into a more adversarial and complex
process. 2
In addition, the legal regime governing international arbitration in
the United States is complex and difficult for newcomers to navigate.
The United States has ratified the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the "New York Convention"),
as well as the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration (the "Panama Convention," collectively the "Conventions").
U.S. law has a now long-established history of providing strong support
to both party autonomy in arbitration and the enforceability of arbitral
agreements and awards. Despite these clear commitments to the
1. The most obvious example of a case cited abroad is the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985). Many foreign courts have cited it and other U.S. cases. See, e.g., Fiona Trust &
Holding Corp. v. Privalov [2007] 1 All E.R. (Comm.) 891 (English Court of Appeal),
afftd, [2007] UKHL 40 (House of Lords); Hebei Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. Polytek Eng'g Co.,
XXIVa Y.B. Comm. Arb. 652, 668 (H.K. Court of Final Appeal, High Court 1999)
(1999); Gas Auth. of India, Ltd v. SPIE-CAPAG SA, XXIII Y.B. Comm. Arb. 688, 694
(Delhi High Court 1993) (1998).
2. See, e.g., Lucy Reed & Jonathan Sutcliffe, The "Americanization" of
International Arbitration?, MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP., April 2001, at 11; Elena V.
Helmer, International Commercial Arbitration: Americanized, "Civilized," or
Harmonized?, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 35 (2003).
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Conventions, the American law on international arbitration is not always
fully accessible to those who consult it. Foreign lawyers and foreign
parties, as well as many U.S. judges and lawyers, understandably find it
challenging to assess the sometimes intricate relationships between
international and domestic arbitration. As a result, the choice among
potentially applicable laws and precedents is not always clear.
To some extent, this confusion finds its source in the federal statute
governing interstate and international arbitration, the Federal Arbitration
Act of 1925 (the "FAA"). The FAA was enacted well before the New
York Convention, and indeed well before the modern growth of
arbitration as a viable and popular means of resolving commercial
disputes. It is, accordingly, more skeletal than many other national
arbitration laws that govern international arbitration, which were enacted
much later. Chapters 2 and 3 of the FAA include the implementing
legislation for the Conventions, though the interrelationship between the
the three Chapters is not always clear.
Adding to the complexity, there are numerous different forms of
state legislation, including the Uniform Arbitration Act, the Revised
Uniform Arbitration Act ("RUAA") and other statutes that pertain
directly to international arbitration and are often based on the Model Law
on International Commercial Arbitration adopted by the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"). The direct
application of these multiple state and federal laws can be difficult to
understand, but this mix is rendered even more complex by the
uncertainties surrounding the preemptive effect of the FAA. The FAA
has not been held to "occupy the field," and thus preclude all state law on
the subject. The full extent of its preclusive effect, however, remains
uncertain in both the caselaw and the commentary.
In any particular arbitration, these various statutory sources can be
supplemented further by the arbitral rules selected by the parties, as well
as by the lex arbitri (the law of the place where the arbitral award is
made for those awards made abroad) or the parties' choice of substantive
law. The plethora, density and overlap among these different sources
have created both ambiguities and gaps. The resulting complexity and
incompleteness of the system has produced a great many questions that
the Restatement will attempt to address with respect to United States
arbitration law.
III. THE SCOPE OF THE RESTATEMENT
The Restatement addresses arbitration that is "international" and
"commercial," as defined in the Conventions. The primary audience for
the Restatement, therefore, will be U.S. courts and those counsel and
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parties who are conducting international arbitrations that may be, at some
stage, subject to the arbitration law of the U.S. That basic observation,
however, does not fully determine the scope of the Restatement.
First, there is a question of how systematically domestic arbitration
precedents extend into the international context. Some of the leading3
cases that shape U.S. international arbitration law, such as Mastrobuono
and First Options,4 arose out of distinctly domestic cases. Many of these
precedents and their reasoning apply directly in international arbitrations
as a result of applicable choice of law principles. Many questions
remain, however, regarding whether and to what extent they otherwise
apply to international arbitration under the Conventions, particularly
when their reasoning turns on specific provisions of the FAA that relate
to domestic arbitration. One such question that has persisted is the extent
to which domestic precedents that expand the grounds for review, such
as those that permit review for "manifest disregard" of the law, would
also apply to international arbitration.
While the Supreme Court's
6
decision in Hall Street arguably concluded that the "manifest disregard
of law" doctrine is no longer available under the FAA, it remains to be
determined how far the Hall Street decision, which was based on Chapter
1 of the FAA, extends to international arbitration.
While there are questions about the place of domestic arbitration
precedents in the Restatement, there are also separate questions about the
role of foreign and international decisions in a restatement of U.S. law.
Foreign and international law are undoubtedly essential to the
functioning of the international arbitration system, both as a whole and in
individual cases. The direct exposition or analysis of substantive foreign
law, however, would not only be unwieldy, but would also transgress the
primary purpose of the Restatement.
This is a Restatement of the U.S. law of international arbitration.
Consequently, international and foreign sources will be consulted, but
they will not be systematically relied on in drafting. These sources will
be most directly relevant to, and cited for, questions of interpretation of
specific provisions of the Conventions. They may also be relevant,
either as support for or as a basis for contrast with, U.S. treatment of
certain issues for which other systems also have a developed body of
3. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
4. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 939 (1995).
5. See, e.g., Isabella de la Houssaye, Manifest Disregard of the Law in
International Commercial Arbitrations, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 449 (1990);
Stephan Wilske & Mackay, The Myth of the 'Manifest Disregardof the Law'Doctrine:Is
This Challenge to the Finality of Arbitral Awards Confined to US. Domestic Arbitration
or Should International Arbitration Practitioners be Concerned?, 24 ASA BULL. 216
(2006).
6. Hall Street Assoc., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 1396 (2008).
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law. Particularly in this latter respect, foreign and international sources
will be treated primarily in the Reporters' Notes.
Another scope issue relates to the increasing presence in
international commercial arbitration of "investment disputes," a term that
denotes disputes between a State and an investor in that State having a
foreign nationality. Where such disputes arise out of or relate to
contracts (either between States and foreign nationals or between
enterprises of two countries), and there is no provision for arbitration
under a bilateral investment treaty ("BIT") or a regional arrangement
such as NAFTA, they clearly fall within the scope of the Restatement.
However, matters become more complicated where arbitration disputes
fall within the scope of a BIT or a regional investment dispute regime.
The Restatement will include investment arbitration. To exclude
this category would be to ignore the fact that both conventional contractbased arbitrations and investment treaty-based arbitrations arise from
underlying economic transactions that are essentially indistinguishable.
Moreover, a single arbitration may entail both contract- and treaty-based
claims.
Although the Restatement will take up investment arbitration, there
are two important points to be noted. First, investment arbitrations
whose jurisdiction is predicated on an investment treaty, as opposed to a
contract, and/or covered by the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States (the
"ICSID Convention"), involve procedural issues and treatment under
U.S. law that are distinct from their conventional international
commercial arbitration counterparts.
To this extent, investment
arbitration will be treated in the Restatement separately from commercial
arbitration arising out of contractual arrangements.
Second, the
Restatement will not address any of the substantive standards, such as
"fair and equitable treatment" or the definition of "expropriation," that
are raised by these treaty-based international arbitral regimes. Such
substantive liability-related issues properly remain outside the scope of
the Restatement.
IV. THE DRAFTING PROCESS
The initial topic taken up in the drafting process, which will
ultimately be Chapter 5 of the Restatement, is the law of "The
Recognition and Enforcement of Awards." The first Preliminary Draft,
comprised of twenty-seven Articles, was initially presented at an
invitational meeting in New York on February 23, 2009. Given the
nature of the meeting, only the Blackletter provisions and Comments
were distributed and presented. The broad topics addressed include the
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obligation to recognize and enforce international awards, the grounds for
denying recognition and enforcement of awards, and actions to enforce
awards.
Although each of the Reporters has taught and published in the
international arbitration field for many years, the drafting process has
revealed numerous new and intriguing questions not previously
encountered or, in some cases, even contemplated. Some of these issues
still have not been resolved, even after extensive research and debate. As
a result, the first Preliminary Draft contained several bracketed options
that were designed to promote focused discussion and feedback.
One of the questions that eventually proved to be the most enduring,
and fascinating, is what law governs foreign awards that are not subject
to either the New York or the Panama Conventions. Because historically
there have been relatively few cases of this type, it is an area in which
Further
there is little guidance from courts or commentators.
exploration, however, reveals that the subject cannot be discarded as an
esoteric or unimportant issue, even if it arises in a limited number of
actual cases each year.
There are two principal categories of cases to which the
Conventions do not apply: those cases that are not "commercial" and
those that do not satisfy the Conventions' reciprocity requirements.
There are important categories of disputes, arguably including, for
example, some forms of sports arbitration, that may be outside the
"commercial" limitation of the Conventions.
There are also
approximately forty jurisdictions, including Lichtenstein and Taiwan,
that are highly relevant for international arbitration but are still not
signatories to either Convention. These jurisdictions continue to produce
non-Convention awards, including in some historically important cases.
The award in the Bechtel case, for example, was rendered in a nonConvention country. 7
The question of what law applies to this delimited, but potentially
important, set of "non-Convention" awards is elusive. Some courts have
held, without much analysis, that Chapter 1 of the FAA (the set of
provisions governing domestic arbitral awards) applies, while the
Restatement on the Law of Foreign Relations concludes that the
applicable law is state law. Still other commentators suggest that the
governing law should be federal common law.
Answering this seemingly mundane question of what law applies to
a non-Convention award would appear to depend on questions about the
purpose of the relevant limitations on application of the Conventions.
7. Int'l Bechtel Co. v. Dep't of Civil Aviation of Dubai, 360 F. Supp. 2d 136
(D.D.C. 2005).
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For some cases that do not involve commercial disputes, such as those
involving family law claims, the commercial limitation may be intended
to preclude (or reduce the likelihood of) the enforcement of the award.
For other cases arguably outside the definition of "commercial," such as
sports arbitration decisions, the same reasoning does not seem to hold.
Similarly, the Conventions' reciprocity requirements would seem to be
aimed at making awards made in non-Convention countries less readily
enforceable, perhaps to give those countries an incentive to sign on to the
Convention. It is a fair question whether FAA Chapter 1 should be
applied to non-Convention awards since its application may not
accomplish that end.
Another area in which questions of great practical importance
persist, but for which existing cases or commentary offer little guidance,
is the degree to which courts are bound by prior determinations in the
same dispute. Consider the following hypothetical. At Time I, Court A
is asked to refer the parties to arbitration and, in doing so, makes certain
determinations about the meaning, scope, validity and enforceability of
the arbitration agreement, as well as a determination about which parties
are bound by it. At Time II, if the arbitration goes forward, the arbitral
tribunal may be called upon to revisit some or all of the same questions.
At Time III, the losing party seeks to have Court B in the place of
arbitration set aside the award on grounds that are recognized by that
jurisdiction. Some of the issues raised in this proceeding will likely
relate to or even overlap with the challenges to the arbitration agreement
that were raised in" Court A and before the arbitral tribunal. Now,
assume that Court B refuses to set aside the award, and at Time IV, the
party presents the award for recognition or enforcement in Court C.
Once again, very similar if not identical grounds may be advanced for
denying recognition and enforcement.
These scenarios, which are not particularly unusual in cases when
there are challenges that relate to the arbitration agreement, raise a host
of questions. What, if any, relationship is there among the various
decisions? Should later decision-makers show any deference to previous
decisions? Or are these the kind of issues that every court or tribunal in
the chain of courts should, if asked, answer for itself? These scenarios
raise questions not only about the preclusive effect of various
determinations concerning the arbitration agreement, the arbitral
procedure or the arbitral award, but also about the possibility of waiver.
If the disappointed party has failed to contest the arbitration agreement or
award at the time that arbitration was compelled or underway or that the
award was subject to set aside proceedings, is it too late to do so at a later
point in time? Unfortunately, international arbitrations sometimes lead
long and intricate lives, with numerous points of intersection with the
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courts of various jurisdictions, and numerous opportunities for parties to
challenge the validity and enforceability of the arbitration agreement and
award. Courts and commentators have yet to determine exactly what
effect decisions at various points in an arbitration process should have on
subsequent decisions by the same or different decision-makers.
Other important questions lurk in areas that seem relatively
straightforward. For example, when a matter is deemed to be nonarbitrable, does that prohibition extend only to the cause of action arising
out of a specific statute based on U.S. law, such as the Sherman Act
(before Mitsubishi declared such claims arbitrable)? Or does it refer to
the general subject area, irrespective of what national law is asserted,
such as antitrust claims generally, even if raised under foreign law?
Supreme Court analysis appears to center on Congressional intent as
expressed in statutory language. But the Court faced the issue in
deciding whether to enforce an arbitration agreement rather than an
arbitration award. Moreover, adopting the narrower approach could lead
to awkward results in some cases. For example, U.S. courts could be
required to refuse enforcement of an arbitral award if it applies a nonarbitral domestic law, but to enforce that award if it deals with the same
issues under foreign law, even if the foreign law was applied
intentionally to avoid the non-arbitrability under U.S. law.
Finally, there are also a number of questions on which there is
unclear or divided authority, but the Restatement will ultimately have to
take a definitive position. For example, the text of Article XIV of the
New York Convention, quizzically states:
A Contracting State shall not be entitled to avail itself of the present
Convention against other Contracting States except to the extent that
it is itself bound to apply the Convention.
At a literal level, this text seems to refer to the rights of Contracting
States against each other under international law. This language has
been interpreted by a number of commentators, however, as extending
the reciprocity reservation beyond the signatory status of the jurisdiction
where the award was rendered to some substantive measure of that
State's commitment under the Convention, and thus affecting the
outcome of cases arising under the Convention. While provisions in the
drafting history of Article XIV may be read to support both possible
interpretations, the Restatement will ultimately have to take a position
about which of the two interpretations should prevail under U.S. law.
V.

LOGISTICAL CHALLENGES AND INNOVATIONS

The Restatement presents several logistical challenges that have
prompted efforts at innovating on the traditional procedures of past ALl
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projects. Traditionally, Advisory Committees on Restatements are
limited to approximately 30 members. With this Restatement the ALI
has received record numbers of inquiries from those interested in
participating, through the Advisory Committee or otherwise, in
commenting on drafts of the Restatement. This increased interest is
probably a result of the fact that the international arbitration community
is a uniquely sophisticated, academic and professionally active group.
Many of its practitioner members have their own treatises and regularly
write and speak on the subject, and a number have published their own
treatises. The field of international arbitration is also populated by
institutions around the world, whose rules, practices and experiences
could prove highly useful and relevant.
Limiting the Advisory
Committee to the traditional 30-person size would necessarily preclude
many qualified and interested arbitration specialists from contributing.
Moreover, while the Restatement is decidedly a Restatement of the
U.S. law of international arbitration, it will be both relied on and
critiqued by constituencies outside the United States, including foreign
arbitrators, lawyers and parties, as well as foreign courts and arbitral
institutions. Indeed, one of the salient features of the international
arbitration system is that some of the most prominent American scholars
and practitioners reside overseas and participate regularly in overseas
arbitrations.
For these reasons, while most other Restatements have traditionally
drawn their Advisory Committees from domestic practitioners,
academics and judges, this Project will necessarily have to find ways to
open up its commentary and advisory processes to a more geographically
diverse, and potentially more numerous, group. ALI is still considering
exactly how it will accomplish that goal. A number of innovations,
including technological innovations that would allow virtual meetings
and electronically submitted feedback, are being considered. It may even
be said that adopting for the Restatement drafting process an
internationally inclusive approach and technological innovations mirrors
the international arbitration system itself, which brings together
numerous diverse parties through flexible and innovative procedures.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of the Restatement is not to promote the United States
as a seat of international arbitration, or to export U.S. arbitration law to
other jurisdictions. However, clarifying aspects of U.S. arbitration law
or judicial precedents can remove obstacles that may currently hinder
parties or foreign courts in their use of U.S. law and U.S. courts.
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Parties choose international arbitration primarily because they fear
being subject to the potentially biased decisions of the national courts of
their business-partner-turned-adversary.
Through international
arbitration, parties can choose a neutral procedure and setting in which to
resolve their disputes. To plan effectively, however, parties also need the
law and judicial decisions that provide the framework for the system to
be conceptually accessible and predictable. Clarifying the U.S. law of
international arbitration will aid parties in this endeavor.
States, on the other hand, support the international arbitration
system because they recognize that effective dispute resolution is
essential to international trade. In more recent years, non-arbitrability
barriers have been brought down as a sign of States' growing confidence
in the system, resulting in more and more regulatory issues, such as
antitrust and securities fraud, being channeled into international
arbitration. International arbitration can provide a uniquely effective
means for enforcing such claims when they are properly implicated in
international disputes. Clarifying the U.S. law of international arbitration
will better ensure that the international arbitration system can achieve
this aim.

